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THE LAW SCHOOL. Dr. William Draper Lewis, of the Philadelphia Bar, has been elected Dean of the Law School and has entered
on the duties of the office. Dr. Lewis was formerly editor of the
AmERICAN LAW REGISTER AND REVIEV and is known as the collabo-

rator with Mr. George Wharton Pepper in the preparation of Pepper
and Lewis' Digests, and also for his contributions to legal literature.
A leave of absence for the year has been granted to Professor
Townsend. The enrollment of three hundred and thirty students
is largir than that of any previous year.
MARRIED WOMEN-CONTRACTS.
In the advance sheets of the
Northwestern Reporter, dated September 12th, is an interesting
case concerning the contractual rights of married women, entitled
The Directors of the Chamber of Commerce v. Goodman. The case
was decided by the Supreme Court of Michigan with three of the
Justices dissenting.

The plaintiff sued the defendant to recover for an amount due on

a subscription. The defendant together with others signed the
subscription paper, agreeing to contribute the amount opposite
her name in order that the directors of the Chamber of Commerce might be able to locate the Chamber of Commerce building
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at the comer of State and Griswold Streets, Detroit. The defendant's subscription was not paid. When it was made she was a
married woman and possessed of a valuable building about a block
away from the proposed site, and she signed the p~aper in the belief
that the new building would add to the value of her property.
The only question in the case is, had the defendant the legal
ability to make the subscription? The contractual power of afeme
coverte being accorded her by statute, the sole difficulty involved is
the interpretation of the Michigan Act of Legislature on that subject. It is provided (How. Ann. St. § 6295) that her separate
estate may be contracted, sold, mortgaged, etc., as if she were
unmarried.
This right has been uniformly interpreted as giving her not a
general capacity to contract, but only the ability to make contracts
which relate directly to the improvement of her separate property:
West v. Laraway, 28 Mich. 464; Emery v. Lord, 26 Mich. 431
D Vries v. Conklin, 22 Mich. 255; Reed v. Buys, 44 Mich. 8o;
Xitchell v. -4fidgett, 3 7 Mich. 8 1.
The fact, however, that her property is benefited by a contract
is not alone sufficient to make her liable; there must be a direct
relation between the contract and her property: Reed v. Buys, 44
Mich. 8o; Emery v. Lord, 26 Mich. 431 ; Willard v. Magoon,
30 Mich. 273; Newconb v. Andrews, 41 Mich. 520. If this
contract had been entered into by the defendant to purchase property or directly to improve her separate estate her liability would
have been unquestioned. The minority of the court were of the
opinion that if the effect of the erection of a handsome structure
near her property was to increase the value of her building, as the
jury found it did, she did in fact acquire property and should be
liable on her subscription. The better opinion, as was held by the
majority of the court, seems, however, to be that the statute was not
made with the intent to remove all the common law disabilities of
married women, nor should it be extended by construction to cases
not embraced in its language nor within its design: De VHes v.
Conklin, 22 Mich. 259. As it was stated by Mr. Justice Cooley,
in Russell v. Bank, 39 Mich. 67i : "The test of competency to
make the contract is to be found in this, that it does or does not
deal with the woman's individual estate. Possible incidental benefits cannot support it." While that case was one of suretyship
nevertheless it seems applicable to the present question. It cannot
be doubted but that the benefit to be derived by the defendant's
property from her subscription was but incidental and indirect,
consequently the application of the test given by Mr. Justice
Cooley could lead to no other decision than that reached by the
majority of the court. But their decision is not justified on that
ground alone, for not only the cases interpreting the statute but the
words of the act itself seem to lead to the same conclusion.
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1896, p. 17. The Act of March 29, 1832, P. L. 19o, §31, gives
the Orphans' Court discretionary power to order the sale or mortgage of real estate for the payment of decedents' debts. The later
Act of May 29, 1832, P. L. 19o, § 59, gives a right of appeal to
the Supreme Court, to any person aggrieved by a defihitive sentence
or decree of the Orphans' Court.
Such appeal is exceedingly rare, however, as the Supreme Court
has uniformly held that it will not review the actions of the Orphans"
Court in the exercise of its discretion unless it appear on the face
of the record that there was a palpable and gross abuse of such
discretion. This rule is clearly enunciated in Williams's Estate,
140 Pa. x87.
Here the Orphans' Court having decreed a sale of
decedents' property, and later confirmed the same, upon petition
subsequently set the sale aside. On appeal to the Supreme Court
it was held that the matter was within the discretion of the Orphans'
Court and therefore no appeal would lie. In Need's 4.#eal, 7o
Pa. 113, there being already an executor, the court appointed a
stranger to make the sale of the premises. On appeal the Supreme
Court held that the abuse was not sufficiently palpable upon the face
of the record. See also in this connection: Stiver's Appeal, 56 Pa.
9 ; Schwilke's Appeal, ioo Pa. 628; Hoope'sEstate,152 Pa. o5;
Me Credy's Appeal, 2 Brewster, 200. In Robinson v. Afc Claren, i i
Pa. 414, the court went so far in this direction as to decline to disturb a decree of the Orphans' Court, refusing to order the sale of
the land of a ward, though it appeared on the face of the record
that the auditor had reported the sale to be both necessary and
expedient.
Nor will the court review the appointments of guardians by the
Orphans' Court: Gray's Apeal, 96 Pa. 243.
However,-in the recent case of Smith's Estate, page 17, Advance
Reports, Oct. 2, 1896, the court has indicated the point beyond
which the use made by the Orphans' Court of its discretion cannot
be ignored.
George Smith died, leaving a farm to his son William, and a
house and lot to his son Darwin. The will stated that the testator
did not wish that a debt which he owed to William should in any
way be charged upon Darwin's share, as the farm left to William
was far more valuable than the portion left to the younger son.
By a codicil, however, he directed that all his indebtedness, whatsoever, after exhausting the personalty, should be paid out of Darwin's house and lot. Darwin contests the codicil as having been
obtained by his elder brother through undue influence. The latter
who is also executor applies for an order to sell the house and lot,
and there being no personalty, the order is granted in spite of Darwin's protest that the codicil is in course of litigation. The sale
takes place and the court confirms it, again under protest from
Darwin, who alleges that his interests will be seriously damaged
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thereby and that there is no necessity for such hasty proceedings,
and he thereupon appeals. The Supreme Court held that by its
decree the Orphans' Court had virtually passed upon the validity of
the codicil, which was beyond its powers to do, and by its unnecessary haste had wrought great injustice to the appellant.
"If the court supposed it could make Darwin whole out of
William's farm, for any loss sustained by the hurried sale, it was
without power to make the order, for no court has the power to
to direct the sale of one man's property to pay another's debt . . .
If the court merely assumed that Darwin would lose his case on
appeal, then the decree was an arbitrary exercise of power, which is
an abuse of discretion. In either view the decree is not sustainable
for what the appellee seems to term discretion is in both cases mere
despotism, the exercise of power by one in authority without
basing the exercise of it on established fact or recognized principle."
Decree reversed and set aside, the appellee to pay costs.
It seems, therefore, that the court will entertain an appeal in
extraordinary cases, but only where the abuse of discretion is flagrant and notorious and appears clearly upon the record.
SALE OF GOODWILL.

The law in regard to the right of the

vendor, in a sale of the good-will of a business, to solicit his
former customers was thought to be permanently settled by Pearson
v. Pearson, 27 Ch. D. 145, and the cases which followed it, but
the decision in Trego v. Hunt, L. R. App. Cas., Dec. 5, 1895,
has changed the current* of authority, at least in England. In
order that the effect of that decision may be more clearly seen, a
brief review of the law on the subject is necessary.
The question came squarely before the English courts for the
first time in Labouchere v. Dawson, L. R. 13 Eq. 322, and it was
decided that the vendor could be enjoined from soliciSing his old
customers. The reason given by Lord Romilly was that persolis
are not at liberty to depreciate the thing which they have sold.
Eight years later, Ginesiv. Cooper &- Co., 14 Ch. D. 596 (x88o),
Jessel, M. R., held the same opinion and, though this was dictum,
carried the doctrine to the extent of saying that the vendor must
not deal with his old customers even if they followed him of their
own accord. In the subsequent cases of Leggot v. Barrett, 15
Ch. D. 306, and Walker v. AlAotlram, i9 Ch. D. 355, these views
were substantially affirmed, though the restrictions upon the vendor
were held to apply only in the cases of voluntary alienation of the
business, not in that of forced sales in bankruptcy.
In 1884, however, in the case of Pearson v. Pearson, 27 Ch. D.
145, Labouchere v. JDawson, suipra, was overruled by Baggallay
and Cotton, L. JJ., Lindley, L. J., dissenting. The court considered that Labouchere v. Dawson, supra, had gone beyond anything to be found in the earlier cases, and that it had been much
questioned. Cotton, L. J., said: "It is admitted that a person
who has sold the goodwill of his business may set up a similar busi-
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mess'next door and say that he is the person who carried on the old
business. I cannot see where to draw the line; if he may by his
.acts invite the old customers to deal with him, and not with the
.purchaser, why may he not apply to them and ask them to do so?
American authority upon the subject is very scarce, though an
.idea as to what the courts would have said if the question had been
directly presented, may be gathered from decisions bordering upon
it. In Hall's Appeal, 6o Pa. 458, it was held that a man who had
sold his business, could not hold himself out as having removed
from the former place to a new one where he would continue his
-old business. - The court said: "He sold the goodwill of his business to the plaintiff for a valuable consideration and good faith
.requires that he should do nothing which directly tends to deprive
him of its benefits and advantages."
It is well settled, on the other hand, that the vendor may establish a similar business at the next door, if he does not induce anyone to believe that he is the successor of the old business : Hanna
v. Andrews, 50 Iowa, 462 ; Bassett v. Percival, 5 Allen (Mass.),
345; Cattrell v. Babcock, 54 Conn. :122 ; Hoxie v. Chaney, 143
Mass. 592 ; Smith v. Gibbs, 44 N. H. 335. But an express contract in restraint of trade within a reasonable radius would of
-course be supported: Dwight v. Ramilton, 113 Mass. 175 ; AfcClurg's Appeal, 58 Pa. 51 ; Butler v. Burleson, 16 Vt. 176;
Beardv. Dennis, 6 Ind. 200. The general tendency has been
-only to restrict the vendor when there has been some such positive
contract; see Cattrellv. Babcock (supra); Bergamini v. Bastian,
5i La. Ann. 6o. It is most probable that had any case directly
upon the point in question arisen, the reasoning of the English
courts would have appealed to an American judge.
The case of Trego v. Hunt (supra), expressly approves of
Labouchere v. Dawson (supra), and overrules the reasoning of
Pearson v. Pearson (supra). In his opinion Lord Herschell, said:
"The reason of Baggallay, L. J. (in Pearson v. Pearson), for dis.senting from Zabouchere v. Dawson, so far as it is disclosed by the
xeport of his judgment, appears to be that it went beyond a number of
-decisions ofa highercourt, and, as he thought, without sufficient reason.
I propose now to examine the older authorities. I may state at
once, that I can find nothing in them inconsistent with the decision
in Labouchere v. Dawson." His Lordship quoted the language of
Jessel, M. R., in Ginesi v. Cooper, suPra: "Attracting customers
to the business is a matter connected with the carrying it on. It
is the formation of that connection which has made the value of
the thing that the late firm sold, and they really had nothing else
He then continued himself:
to sell in the shape of goodwill."
"1It is the connection thus formed, together with the circumstances,
whether of habit or otherwise, which tend to make it permanent,
that constitutes the goodwill of a business. It is this which constitutes the difference between a business just started, which has no
goodwill attached to it, and one which has acquired a goodwill.
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The former trader has to seek out his customers fror among the
community as best he can. The latter has a custom ready made.
• . . What obligations then does the sale of the goodwill of a
business impose upon the vendor?"
His Lordship went on to
show that, though it was hard to 'draw the line,' spoken of by
Cotton, L. J., supra, still certain cases were on one side of it,
others on the other, and continued: " If a person who has previously been a partner in a firm sets up in business on his own account
and appeals generally for custom, he only does that which any
member of the public may do, and which those carrying on the same
trade are already doing. It is true that those who were former customers of the firm to which he belonged may of their own accord transfer
their custom to him; but this incidental advantage is unavoidable,.
and does not result from any act of his. He only conducts his business in precisely the same way as he would if he had never been a
member of the firm to which he previously belonged. But when
he specifically and directly appeals to those who were customers of
the previous firm he seeks to take advantage of the connection
previously formed by his old firm, and of the knowledge of that
connection which he has previously acquired, to take that which
constitutes the goodwill away from the persons to whom it has been
sold and to restore it to himself."
In these sentences his Lordship has stated the kernel of the
whole matter. If by frequent decisions it has been settled that the
vendor may set up in a similar business next door, that must
be accepted, and the mere difficulty of drawing a line between this
case and that of soliciting the old customers should not be conclusive against doing so. It certainly does not seem just that a man
should be able to sell a thing and then immediately do his best
to destroy it. In the domain of tangible property he would be
guilty of a trespass, and it appears wholly reasonable that he should
here be restrained by injunction.
For an excellent review of the law of goodwill up to and including Pearsonv. Pearson (supra), the reader is referred to a former
number of this magazine: AMERICAN LAW REGISTER, Vol. 33,
p. 216 (1894).
LETTING OF MUNICIPAL CONTRACTS.
Recently several cases
involving the letting of municipal contracts to the lowest bidder orlowest responsible bidder, have been before the courts in various
forms for adjudication.
In the case of Talbot Paving Co. v. City of Detroit, 67 N. W.
979, the plaintiff paving company brought action against themunicipality of Detroit to recover damages alleged to have been
sustained by reason of the refusal ofthe defendant's city council to.
let to it a contract for paving for which it was the lowest bidder.
Another bidder had put in a bid for a slightly higher sum, and was
awarded the contract. The plaintiff furnished the contract bonds
required by law, and the board of public works thereupon executed.
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a contract with the plaintiff in due form. The matter was referred
to a committee, which after a time reported that the bid was
informal, without stating what the informality was, and recommended that the next higher bid be accepted. Plaintiff filed a
petition for a mandamus to compel the council to confirm this bid.
An answer was given, issue of fact raised, which was sent to court
for trial, and finally settled in favor of the plaintiff. In the meantime, however, the paving had been completed. On that account
solely, the court said, was the mandamus refused.
The counsel for the city contended that although the contract
awarded may have been void, yet the plaintiff, whose bid was
rejected, could have no right of action at law to recover prospective
profits; that, whenever an action may be brought for a breach of
duty imposed by statute, the plaintiff must show that he had an
interest in the performance of the duty, and that the duty was
imposed for his benefit. Long, C. J., in the opinion, said that
"while under the charter of Detroit, it was the duty of the city to
let the contract to the lowest responsible bidder, yet this provision
was not passed for the benefit of the bidder, but as a protection to
the public," and followed the rule laid down in Strong v. Campbell,
ii Barb. 138, where a duty is created or imposed for the benefit of
another, and the advantage to be derived by the party prosecuting
by its performance is merely incidental, and no part of the design
of the statute, no such right is created as forms the subject of an
action. This is fully borne out by the case of Trustees of Village
of Plattsburgh, 16 N. Y. x61, which contains in a note the opinion
written by Mr. Justice Selden in the case of West v. Trustees of the
Village of Brackport. The English and American cases on the
subject are there reviewed at length. In the course of the learned
opinion, it is said, '"we see from the two classes of cases that there
is an important distinction between the obligations assumed by
private individuals for a consideration received from the government or sovereign power of the state and those assumed by public
officers. . . . The reason for the distinction appears to be that
intimated by Gould, J., in.Lane v. COtton, i Ld.Raym. 646, viz.,
that the duties in the one case are imposed upon the officer for
public purposes only, while in the others they are voluntarily
assumed with a view to private advantage. The cases which have
been cited show that, in respect to this distinction, corporations
This
have been placed upon the same footing as individuals."
seems to be the true rule, that public officers are not liable to an
individual for neglect of duty "except in cases where the act performed or omitted to be performed was with a view to some private
The public may complain and prosecute the delinadvantage."
quent official; but the individual, though injured, has no action
for damages unless it can be shown that the duty imposed upon the
official is for the individual benefit of the plaintiff, though that
benefit be one for the advantage of many. As an answer to the
contention that this rule would be a great burden upon the public
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and lead to the perpetration of frauds in municipal affairs, two
points are made: First, in these instances the public are not the
complainants; second, the plaintiff is not in a position to take
advantage of the act, because the charter was not made for its
individual benefit. The only case which appears to rule a recovery
for the individual in such instances as this under consideration is
the case of Adsit v. Brady, 4 Hill, 630. Selden, J., in his opinion
above referred to, after a careful analysis shows reasons for believing
that the decision in Adsit v. Brady was based upon a rule which is
too broad, a rule which "makes no distinction between officers who
owe a duty to individuals from whom they receive a compensation
for the performance of some specific service, and those whose obligations are to the public alone; a distinction which seems to rest
upon a solid foundation of reason."
There is another question in connection with these cases, in
respect to which the courts of various jurisdictions are divided. It
is this-Is the duty of the officers of a public corporation entrusted
with the letting of contracts for municipal supplies and works to the
lowest responsible bidders a merely ministerial one, and may the
letting of such contracts be controlled by mandamus ? The Supreme Court of South Dakota in a case of habeas corpus proceedings, In re AIfcCain, 68 N. W. 163, takes sides with the courts
which have held that the duty is not merely a ministerial one, but
the terms of each bid must be carefully considered, and the exercise
of judgment cannot be controlled by mandamus. See Douglass v.
Com., io8 Pa. 559 ; Madison v. Harbor Board, 25 Atl. 337 ;
State v. Board, 24 Wis. 683; Xelley v. Chicago, 62 I11. 281 ;
State v. AcGrath, 91 Mo. 386, 3 S. W. 846; High, Extr. Leg.
Rem., § 92. But "agents of municipal corporations must maintain themselves within the law in the matter of awarding contracts,
and if through fraud or manifest error not within the discretion
confided to them, they are proceeding to make a contract which
will illegally cast upon taxpayers a substantially larger burden of
expense than is necessary, the courts will interfere by injunction to
the effect of restricting their action to proper bounds: " Times
Publishing Co. v. City of Everett et al., 37 Pac. 695, 9 Wash. 518;
Crompton v. Zabriski, ioi U. S. 6oi ; People v. Dwyer, 90 N. Y.
402 ; Mayor v. Keyser, 72 Md. 1o6; Beach, Pub. Cor., §§ 634,
635; Ifigh, Injunctions, §§ 1E25 -1253.
In Nebraska, mandamus was issued where commissioners did not
give a contract to the lowest bidder, when the statute enacted that
the county commissioners might let contracts to "the lowest competent bidder: " People v. Commissioners, Etc., 4 Neb. 150. See
People v. ContractingBoard, 46 Barb. 254, and 33 AM. LAW. REG.
& REv., N. S. 899.
NEGOTIABILITY OF PROMIssoRY NOTES. It is to be regretted that
judges continue to add to the unsettled condition of decision upon
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.questions relating to commercial paper. An unenviable instance of
this is found in the reasoning of several judges of the Supreme Court
-of Michigan, in two cases decided on the same day.
Brooke v. Struthers, 68 N. W. Rep. 272 (1896), arose upon a
bill to foreclose a mortgage executed to secure the payment of the
following instrument:
"$iioo.oo. April x, 189o. For value received, April 1, 1893,
I promise to pay the Michigan Mortgage Co., Limited, or Bearer,
eleven hundred dollars, with interest at seven per cent. per annum,
payable semi-annually, which said interest is represented by six
*coupon notes, one payable at the maturity of each installment of interest, and when paid shall be a voucher for the payment of said installments of interest respectively. All payable at . . . . St. Johns,
Mich., with exchange on New York. It is expressly agreed that if
the interest should be unpaid and in arrears for the space of thirty
days, then from and after the lapse of the said thirty days, the whole
of said principal sum, with all the interest unpaid, may, at the
-option of the holder thereof, become and be due and payable
immediately thereafter. This note is of even date with p certain
real estate mortgage made by the maker hereof to said payee and
collateral hereto. Andrew Struthers."
The instruments were assigned to complainant by the payee.
When the note became due, the Michigan Mortgage Co. accepted
a new mortgage and note upon the same premises to take the place of
the first, Struthers the maker, having no knowledge of the assignment of the first mortgage to complainant. Of course, the latter
note was without consideration. This was in time assigned to one
Knapp. Whether or not a decree of foreclosure should be made,
depended upon the negotiability or non-negotiability of the note
assigned to Knapp. Both sets of instruments were in the same terms.
The words "with exchange on New York" are held not to destroy
the negotiability of a note in Michigan. AiMi. LAW REG. & REv.,
Vol. 35, N. S. 597The note and mortgage were simultaneously executed, so that the
court very properly construed them together: Jones, 1ort., § 71,
Daniel, Neg. Ins., §156. The mortgages contained a provision
whereby the mortgagor agreed to pay all taxes and assessments upon
the premises, and whereby the whole amount of principal and
interest should become due and payable in the event of the mortgagor's leaving unpaid any tax or assessment for thirty days.
Justices Hooker and Grant in the principal opinion concluded,
in face of all authority, that this provision rendered the note
uncertain in time of payment, hence non-negotiable.
In a single paragraph Mr. Justice Montgomery, with whom concurred Long, C. J., and Moore, J., announced his assent to the
result that complainant was entitled to a decree of foreclosure, but
upon different grounds. When the second mortgage was executed,
by a statute of Michigan which did not exist when the first mortgage
-was executed, a mortgagee was liable to pay the tax upon the mortgage
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or upon his interest in the mortgaged land. The provision in the
mortgage, referred to above, these judges held, indicated a purpose by
the mortgagor to relieve the mortgagee of this statutory obligation,
and to that extent rendered the amount payable to or on behalf of the
mortgagee uncertain, and therefore the second note assigned to
Knapp was non-negotiable. The learned Justice adds that his views
of the negotiability of the first note appear in the next case: Wilsonr
v. Campbell, 68 N. W. 278.
The conclusion of these judges is undoubtedly correct. Though
the same provision exists in the mortgage in complainant's hands,
no statute then existed, making the mortgagee liable for any taxes,
so that the mortgagor promised to do no more than the law
compelled him to do; whereas in the second, the maker's independent promise to pay the taxes for which the mortgagee was liable
under the law of Michigan, clearly renders the note non-negotiable.
In the other case, to which Mr. Justice Montgomery refers,
Wilson v. Campbell, a note and mortgage similar in provision to
those considered in Brooke v. Struthers, were before the court.
These were executed prior to the statute referred to in that case
rendering the mortgagee liable for taxes. The court, per Montgomery and Moore, JJ., considered the clause, providing that in
default of payment of taxes for thirty days the whole amount should
be due and payable, and concluded that under all the authorities
such a provision did not render the time of payment uncertain.
This certainly overrules the ground taken by Hooker and Grant, JJ.,
in the preceding case. The opinion then considers the provision
relating to payment of taxes, and concludes that it does not render
the amount of this note uncertain for the reason stated above. To
this opinion Grant and Hooker, JJ., add, "We concur in the above
opinion because it is ruled by the case of Brooke v.Struthers."
That there is no uncertainty as to the time in such cases is the
universal rule: Carlon v. Kenealey, 12 N. W. 139; Cota v. Buck,
7 Metc. 588 ; Ernst v. Steckman, 74 Pa. 13 ; Chicago, Etc., v.
Mferchants' Bank, 136 U. S. 268. In Ernst v. Steckman (supra),
approved by Mr. Justice Harlan, Chicago, Etc., v. Mferchants' Bank
(supra), the rule is thus stated: To constitute a negotiable
promissory note, the time or event for its ultimate payment must
be fixed and uncertain; yet it may be made subject to contingencies upon the happening of which, prior to the time of its
absolute payment, it shall become due. The contingency depends
upon some act done or omitted to be done by the maker, or upon
the occurrence of some event indicated in the note; and not upon
any act of the payee or holder, whereby the note may become due
at an earlier day.
It is unfortunate that the views of Hooker and Grant, JJ., appear
in the reports to unsettle the stability of the rules of the law of
commercial paper.

